

Prepared for:
United Nations
World Food Programme, Nepal

A STUDY ON CONFLICT INDUCED FOOD INSECURITY IN NEPAL

[Dailekh, Jumla, Dadeldhura and Kailali]

By
Shiva Sharma
Ram Krishna Sharma

October 2002



National Labour Academy-Nepal (NLA)

P. O. Box: 11242, Anamnagar, Kathmandu, Nepal

Phone: 977-1-255908 & 225957; Fax: 977-1-248073

Email: nla@mail.com.np

Table of Contents

Abbreviations.....	ii
Executive Summary	iii
Chapter I: Introduction	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Objective	2
1.3 Macro situation.....	2
1.3.1 Country Background	2
1.3.2 Nepalese Economy	3
1.3.3 Poverty Situation.....	3
1.3.4 Food Balance	4
1.3.5 Nutritional Dimensions of Available Food.....	5
1.4 Conceptual Framework of the Study	5
1.5 Methodology	9
1.5.1 General	9
1.5.2 VDC Selection for Focus Group Discussion	9
1.6 Limited of the Study	10
Chapter II: Food Security in Conflict Situation: Findings from Field Survey	11
2.1 Characteristics of Study Districts	11
2.2 Food Security Situation.....	12
2.2.1 Food Availability	13
2.2.2 Food through Market	15
2.2.3 Food Access.....	16
2.2.4 Food Utilization	20
2.2.5 Results of Focus Group Discussion.....	20
2.3 WFP Activities	24
Chapter III: Conclusions and Recommendations	25
3.1 Conclusions	25
3.2 Recommendations	28
References	28

| ANNEXES

Abbreviations

AGDP	Agricultural Gross Domestic Product
APROSC	Agricultural Projects Services Centre
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CDR	Central Development Region
DDC	District Development Committee
EDR	Eastern Development Region
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFE	food for Education
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSVP	Food Security and Vulnerability Profile
FWDR	Far-west Development Region
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
LDO	Local Development Officer
MCHC	Mother and Child Health Care
MOAC	Ministry of Agriculture and co-operatives
MWDR	Mid-west Development Region
NFC	Nepal Food Corporation
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NHDR	Nepal Human Development Report
NLA	National Labour Academy
NPC	National Planning Commission
RCIW	Rural Community Infrastructure Works
VDC	Village Development Committee
WDR	Western Development Region
WFP	World Food Programme
WFS	World Food Summit

Executive Summary

Nepal is experiencing a mounting problem of civil unrest since last seven years due to the Maoist insurgency. The situation is worsening day-by-day causing a breakdown of all aspects of the social and economic systems. The situation seems to have been moving towards an unknown but miserable end. The present crisis has further aggravated the food insecurity and poor health and nutrition for the vast majority of the poor people. While the severity of the problem is well recognized, there has been little analytical work to gauge its magnitude. In view of this, the World Food Programme (WFP), Nepal entrusted the National Labour Academy-Nepal (NLA) to assist in profiling the newly emerged vulnerable groups of people and provide a clear understanding of food security dynamics.

Four districts from the Mid-western and Far-western development regions were selected for the study. This was done purposively because in these two regions poverty incidence as well as intensity of Maoist insurgency is high. The selected districts for the study are Dailekh and Jumla from the Mid-western and Dadeldhura and Kailali from Far-western development regions.

The study is based on primary and secondary information. Primary data collection was limited to the district level and community level key informants' approach.

After the government declared a state of emergency about a year ago, food availability has worsened from the viewpoint of both local production and import. Out of the total, 40, 33, 27 and 16 percent of the VDCs are heavily affected in Dadeldhura, Jumla, Dailekh and Kailali, respectively. It is difficult to quantify the level of production decline, but discussion with the key informants suggested that, in heavily affected VDCs, the decline may be in the range of 10 to 15 percent, and in moderately affected VDCs, a decline of up to 10 percent is expected. The incentive to produce surplus has been impaired as Maoists take control over such surplus. In addition, inputs, particularly fertilizer, seed and extension services are not moving to the villages. Similarly, supply of food through the market has also been severely hindered largely due to the fear of the Maoists or due to the restrictions by the district administration in the movement of food across and within districts. Such restrictions are informal and without a legal ground.

Food supply tied to development work – 'Food for Work' type, though in limited scale, is reported to be reaching to the target areas and target people. Occasionally, hassles in administration of such food were reported, but the disturbances are far less/severe than what is faced in the food supply through private traders.

Own household production and income levels of the people are both declining in the study districts due to decrease in agriculture production and reduced employment opportunities within the districts. This has reduced people's access to food in areas where the problem of insecurity is intense. In particular, households dependent on wage employment and market supply of food grains are being adversely affected.

The incentives to produce surplus needs to be restored. Decline in production in the already food deficit regions has the potential to further worsen the alarming situation in terms of food availability and lead to much graver food insecurity in the districts. The Maoists should restrain from their "food extraction" activities. Food production is also being affected by low intensity of inputs use and lack of extension and technological support. Restrictions on marketing of metal and production of agricultural tools should be eased. As it is obvious,

such restrictions have affected the local farmers rather than the intended Maoists. Similarly, extension and other services should be expanded rather than limiting it to the district headquarters.

Regulation and restrictions on external food supply by traders should be reviewed, and movement of food to villages should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Such restrictions have not caused starvation among the Maoists, rather they have aggravated the food insecurity situation in the villages. Similarly, the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) should augment its food supply in the affected districts and ensure that the supply reaches the most needy areas and people. By far, the NFC supply is not taking into account the added requirement arising from the conflict.

Food flows for development works at the moment is meager in view of the food deficit situation in the districts. In addition, the insecurity situation has further fuelled food insecurity. Such flows should be increased letting more and more food to reach the most affected regions and villages. Both the administration and Maoists should allow free passage and fair distribution of food to the real beneficiaries as determined by the stakeholders such as WFP.

The trend of out-migration is accelerating in the districts as a result of fear of insecurity and lack of employment opportunities in the villages. Acceleration of infrastructure building activities such as roads and irrigation systems will have a dual impact--food reaching to the poor and food insecure groups, and retention of likely migrants. Such activities should be intensified in the areas of the districts which are most affected by the current conflict situation.

With the increased out-migration flow in the districts, one would have expected concomitant increase in the flow of remittances. However, due to the fear of money being extorted by security personnel on either side of the Nepal-India border and by the Maoists (money is brought in person), the flow of remittances seems to have shrunk considerably. Hence, there is a need to encourage and facilitate money transfers by the migrants to their families using banking or postal systems. Non-government organizations can play a key role in facilitating such transfers.

In addition to the above recommendations, seeking long term solutions to the conflict and increased social and economic development interventions in the districts are called for. Indeed, poverty and deprivation in the districts have served as a fertile ground for the Maoists to nurture and expand their activities. Increased development interventions and inclusion of excluded groups in the development process are essential to achieve a durable and equitable solution to the present situation.

Chapter I

Introduction

1.1 Background

Food security is a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (WFS, 1996). This definition encompasses several dimensions of food security. First, it implies both physical and economic access to sufficient food. Second, it means that such access should encompass all people irrespective of their economic and social backgrounds. Third, it implies such access at all times in a year, and in times of unusual events like war and times of natural calamity. Fourth, it implies that food has to be safe, nutritious and conducive to a healthy life. Food insecurity is said to be present when food is not available as per these norms. The reasons of food insecurity may be unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution or inefficient use of food. Food security is considered to be the prime concern of people everywhere for their livelihood and survival. However, food security is different than food self-sufficiency in the sense that the latter emphasises increased production of food crops whereas the former also requires that there is access to the food.

In Nepal, people have to make their living with limited sources of income. This puts them always in a state of higher level of vulnerability and with limited number of coping options. So, unrest of any kind such as the current situation created by the Maoists pushes them into a critical situation of food insecurity.

The Maoist insurgency started in Nepal from February 1996. Initially, it pleaded for good governance, equitable development and transparency and accountability in the state activities. Since then, many people have been killed from both the Maoists and government sides. There are four categories of people killed in the process: Maoist activists, security personnel, alleged informers of security forces (police and army), and innocent civilians. Three rounds of talks were held between the government and Maoists in between August to November 2001. But, suddenly, the Maoists withdrew from the negotiation and resumed their armed violence blaming the government for the failure of the talks. They attacked army camps and government offices in several districts and killed many people including security personnel. In response, the government imposed a state of emergency in the country and declared the Maoists as terrorists in November 2001.

The Maoist insurgency, which began from three mid-western hill districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot, a western district of Gorakha and an eastern district of Sindhuli, has now spread to around seventy districts out of the total 75 districts. However, most affected districts fall within the mid- and far-western regions where around five million

people live. More than 50 percent of them are living in very highly conflict affected districts. It is quite known that this conflict situation has adversely affected the livelihood of the people and deteriorated their socioeconomic status.

The conflict situation is worsening day-by-day causing a breakdown of the social and economic systems. It seems to have been moving towards an unknown but still graver end. The present crisis is further aggravating the already serious food insecurity and deteriorated health and nutrition condition of the people. While the severity of the problem is well recognized, there has been little analytical work to gauge its magnitude. In view of this, the World Food Programme (WFP), Nepal entrusted the National Labour Academy-Nepal (NLA) to assist in profiling the newly emerged vulnerable groups of people and outline the processes involved with a view to giving a clear understanding of food security dynamics of the people affected by the ongoing conflict.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this study is to develop a general profile, which seeks to look into the dynamism of food security of conflict affected people, conduct interactions between WFP interventions and conflict (how one affects the other), and suggest possibilities of strategic initiatives to ease the food insecurity problem.

1.3 Macro Situation

To put the study in perspective, basic characteristics of the Nepalese economy, poverty situation in the country, overall food balance situation and nutritional dimensions of available food are presented in this section. This would help in understanding the macro situation of food security in Nepal.

1.3.1 Country Background

Nepal is a landlocked country sandwiched between China to the north and India on the other three sides. Its geographical area is about 147 000 km² with the population of 23.2 million. It is broadly divided into three roughly parallel east-west regions (ecological belts), which from north to south are known as the mountains, hills and Tarai containing 35, 42 and 23 percent of the total area, and 7, 44 and 49 percent of the total population, respectively. Most of the mountain and hill districts are food deficit areas whereas the Tarai districts generally produce surplus food. Nepal Food Corporation, a public sector undertaking, purchases food grains from the surplus areas and sells in food deficit areas at subsidised prices.

For administrative and developmental purposes, the country is divided into five development regions – Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western and Far-western, running north-south. There are 14 zones, 75 districts, 3,914 Village Development Committees (VDCs) and 58 municipalities in the country. The Mid-western and Far-western

Development Regions are comparatively less developed in terms of infrastructure and economic activities.

1.3.2 Nepalese Economy

Nepal is one of the world's least developed countries with a per capita income of US\$210. More than 40 percent the people are living below the poverty line, and its concentration is more in rural areas where more than 90 percent of the people live. Facts such as more than 80 percent of the people are engaged in agriculture, 70 percent of the farm families hold less than 1 hectare farm land, the average family size is 5.7, and the average yield of food crops is less than 2 tons per hectare are enough to provide a tentative sketch and extent of poverty in the country. The country's major socio-economic indicators are also lower as compared to those in other South Asian countries. Life expectancy at birth of around 60 years and adult literacy at 53.7 percent are among the lowest in the world. Un-employment statistics (1.8 percent in 2001) conceals a great deal of unreported underemployment which is in the range of 40 to 50 percent.

The Nepalese economy grew at an annual rate of 4.1 percent between 1990 and 1998. The rate of growth of agricultural GDP (AGDP) was (a) highly variable, (b) negative in three out of those eight years, and (c) lower than population growth in the other five (Sharma and Poudel 2001). In contrast to this, the rate of growth of non-agricultural GDP (NAGDP) has been positive in every year, less variable and greater than the population growth rate. Among the non-agricultural sub-sectors, manufacturing, transport and communications, and community and social services grew faster. The growth of the Nepalese economy is determined mainly by the growth of its agriculture sector since, despite its declining relative importance, it is still the single largest sector of the economy and the main source of livelihood for almost two-thirds of the population.

1.3.3 Poverty Situation

Poverty¹ is widespread in Nepal. When comparing the poverty incidences across the ecological belts, the mountains emerged as having the highest concentration of poor people (63 percent), followed by hill (50 percent) and Tarai (37 percent). A comparison of poverty incidence in rural and urban areas shows that the incidence of poverty is about twice as high in rural areas than in urban areas. In terms of development regions, poverty incidence is lowest in the CDR (34 percent), followed in order by EDR (43 percent), WDR (45 percent), MWDR (59 percent) and FWDR (65 percent). MWDR and FWDR are the worst regions in terms of their share in the total development activities, and hence poverty incidence is also high in these regions (Table 1.1).

¹ The poor are defined as those not having income to meet the basic minimum need of calorie requirement of 2,124 per day. In 1996 prices, this required an income of Rs 2,637. Adding the requirements for non-food items, the total minimum income required was estimated to be Rs 4,404 per annum per capita. Those having an income below this level are considered poor (Sharma and Podel 2001).

Table 1.1: Percentage of Population below Poverty Line by Development Region

Development Region	Ecological Belts			All Nepal
	Mountain	Hill	Tarai	
Eastern	57	68	27	43
Central	48	31	34	34
Western	52	46	44	45
Mid-western	72	66	47	59
Far-western	80	73	49	65
Total	63	50	37	45

Source: NHDR, 1998.

1.3.4 Food Balance

The food balance situation (for cereals) of Nepal from 1990/91 to 2000/01 is presented in Table 1.2. With steady growth in population and hence the requirements, annual fluctuations in the level of food balance at the macro level is directly determined by the variation in production of food grains. It can be seen from the table that food balance was positive in 1990/91 and it started to be negative thereafter till 1998/99. From 1999/00, it started again to be positive. However, the deficit as percentage of requirement has never exceeded 12.5 percent at the macro level. The situation seems to have improved in the latter part of the 1990s, as the average deficit was around two percent during 1995/96-1999/2000, compared with 7.7 percent during 1991/92-1994/95. Irrespective of the national situation, the mountain and the hill districts have always remained vulnerable to food shortages. The Tarai, on the other hand, has always been a surplus food producer. All development regions except the EDR are vulnerable to food shortages, although the magnitude varies between regions and across years.

Table 1.2: Edible cereal Grain Production, Requirement and Deficit Situation

Year	Production (000 Mt)	Requirement (000 Mt)	Balance	
			in '000 MT	as % of requirement
1990/91	3,619	3,487	+ 132	+3.78
1991/92	3,373	3,562	-189	-5.31
1992/93	3,292	3,634	-342	-9.41
1993/94	3,585	3,724	-139	-3.73
1994/95	3,398	3,883	-485	-12.49
1995/96	3,917	3,948	-31	-0.79
1996/97	3,973	4,079	-106	-2.6
1997/98	4,027	4,178	-151	-3.61
1998/99	4,098	4,279	-181	-4.23
1999/00	4,452	4,383	+ 69	+1.57
2000/01	4,513	4,383	+83	+1.9

Note : 1. Cereal grain includes rice, maize, wheat, millet and barley

2. (+) indicates surplus and (-) indicates deficit

Source: Marketing Development Directorate, Department of Agriculture.

1.3.5 Nutritional Dimensions of Available Food

Continuing high population growth, slow-growing agricultural output, lack of adequate non-farm opportunities, shortage of nutritious food, high level of poverty, lack of health care facilities, and lack of education and public awareness, have caused various types of nutritional problems among different sections of the population (NPC 1998). The most important forms of malnutrition include protein energy malnutrition, iron deficiency anaemia, vitamin A deficiency and iodine deficiency. Malnutrition among children is around 53 percent and almost three-quarters of pregnant women and half of women aged 15-59 years are anaemic.

Most of the nutritional problems arise from lack of adequate entitlements. Therefore, adequacy of food consumption in the households is one of the important parameters for determining nutritional status and thus food security status. In Table 1.3, a rough approximation of available calories from cereals is compared with estimated requirements. Figures in the table show that for all the years analysed, and by inference for the whole 1990s, energy available from cereals was in shortfall to the extent of 9.5 percent in 1990, 17.7 percent in 1994, 11.3 percent in 1997 and 8.6 percent in 1998. A similar situation is reported in NHDR (1998) which, citing data from MOAC (1992 and 1996), reports a shortfall of about 5 percent on a nutritional energy requirement of 2 250 Kcal per capita per day in 1995.

Table 1.3: Comparison of Available and Required Calorie from Cereals

Reference Year	(Availability and requirements in Kcal/day/person)		Available cereal	Deficit cereal
	Energy Requirement Total	Cereals		
1990/91	2250	1900	1720	180
1994/95			1564	336
1997/98			1685	215
1998/99			1737	163

Source: Energy availability from cereals is computed from MDD data file for respective years and energy requirements from cereals are computed from APROSC (1986).

1.4 Conceptual Framework of the Study

There are three inter-linked components of food security – food availability, food access and food utilization. These three components are determined, individually or jointly, via a number of factors. The broad dimensions of food security concerns are presented in Figure 1.1.

For the purpose of food security analysis, food availability means a situation in which the food required to maintain a safe and healthy life is available for all people in the country. Net domestic production and the balance of imports and exports determine availability.


Domestic production is further determined by a variety of factors like natural, physical, human and technological resources. Exports and imports are determined by the level of production and cost structures mediated by trade policies through structures of tariff and duties. Food availability is broadly reflected in the food supply situation including security food stocks.

Access to food implies that the people in a given location have both physical and economic access to obtain food. Physical access implies a food supply system that ensures easy availability of required foods, and it is determined by local production augmented by imports and by the food distribution system. Economic access implies that those requiring food have the economic means to acquire food that is physically available. It is determined by the income status of the people and by other entitlements through transfers. Access to available food is also determined by the consumption pattern within the household units and by intra-household food distribution systems. Food distribution, employment and income levels and non-market entitlements reflect access to food.

Food utilization relates in part to the capacity to translate food efficiently into energy. This is determined partly by the level of nutritional knowledge and practice. It is also determined by standards of health, which in turn are a function of the physical environment in which people live, their access to safe drinking water, access to health care facilities, etc., which help determine their ability to metabolize food efficiently. Another important aspect of food utilization relates to food consumption patterns within households.


All of the factors that influence food availability, food access and food utilization and thereby the food security situation of households and individuals are affected by the policy and institutional environment under which they live, over which they have little control. The vulnerability context of households is influenced by time trends in variables like population growth, resources, technology, and shocks resulting from factors like bad health, natural calamities, economic events and conflicts; and seasonal variation in prices, production, employment, etc., all of which eventually affect individual and household livelihood systems.

Figure 1.1: Dimensions of Food Security



The issues examined during the present research are outlined in Fig 1.2. The above described analytical framework has been followed while addressing the research objectives, and eliciting and collating the secondary and primary information.

Figure 1.2: Conflict and Food Security: Analytical Framework



1.5 Methodology

1.5.1 General

The study is based on primary and secondary information. Primary data collection was limited to the district level and interaction with community level key informants. Four districts were selected based on the influence of conflict, food security and vulnerability status of the district and presence of ongoing WFP interventions. The selected districts are Dailekh and Jumla from Mid-western and Dadeldhura and Kailali from Far-western Development Regions (Annex 1, Map 1).

In the selected districts, information to address the issues raised in the conceptual framework (Fig 1.1) and the ‘issues’ presented in Figure 1.2 were collected using a checklist and questionnaires that were developed to elicit required information. The inquiry in each district was made from the concerned people/organizations. The field survey was conducted from 21 July 2002 to 25 August 2002. The activities performed to collect the information are summarized as follows.

1. VDC level Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in two VDCs
2. DDC level discussion
3. NGO/INGO discussion – 4 to 5 NGOs
4. Discussion with WFP projects regarding
 - Rural community infrastructure works
 - Food for education
 - Mother and child health care
5. Discussion with local food suppliers and Nepal Food Corporation local office
6. Discussion with District Agriculture and other government offices
7. Discussion with key informants including school teachers

1.5.2 VDC Selection for Focus Group Discussion

A meeting of local elites, government officials, school teachers and representatives from different political parties and farmers was organized in each study district to categorize all the VDCs of the district into heavily, moderately and least affected areas with the perspective of food security situation. After this, two VDCs from each study district were selected for Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Attempts were made to select at least one VDC from the highly Maoist affected areas from each of the study districts. However, it was not possible to visit such areas in Jumla and Kailali districts due to security reasons. Instead, FGDs in these districts were conducted in moderately affected VDCs. The names of the selected VDCs for FGD are given in Table 1.4 and presented in Map in Annex 1, Maps 2, 3, 4, 5). Questionnaire/checklists for FGD was designed pertaining to dynamism of food security based on the conceptual model.

Table 1.1: VDCs Selected for Focus Group Discussion

S.No.	Study Districts	VDCs Selected for FGD
1.	Dailekh	1. Kalika 2. Kusapani
2.	Jumla	1. Kartik Swami 2. Chandan Nath
3.	Dadeldhura	1. Bagarkot 2. Koteli
4.	Kailali	1. Patharaiya 2. Munuwa

1.6 Limitation of the Study

All the study districts fall in the category of highly insecure area where Maoist activities are intense, and the security presence is dense. It was, therefore, not safe to visit interior parts of the districts. The danger was from both the security persons and Maoists. Whatever information was brought had to be carried in disguise or without much description in the notes. During discussions and interactions, people understandably played safe and tried to avoid discussing cause and effects of the situation. Especially, the affected persons would not speak out even after continuous persuasion. Also during field survey, the local governments, VDCs and DDCs were without elected representatives. The ex-representatives generally were away from the districts. In such a situation, it was not possible to conduct the research in the highly affected VDCs in two study districts out of the selected four districts. The methodology of the research, however, was designed in such a way that authentic information would be possible to collect from knowledgeable persons, government officials and people living in the district headquarters. Focus group discussions were also conducted in similar but relatively safe VDCs close to the district headquarters. Hence with alteration in the sampling design and methods, there may be little variation in the findings. Yet, the scale of change is expected to be very low, thus not altering the overall conclusions and recommendations of the study.

Chapter 2

Food Security in Conflict Situation: Findings from Field Survey

2.1 Characteristics of Study Districts


Four districts from among the districts with active Maoist and security force presence from the mid- and far-west regions were selected for empirical investigation of the impact of insecurity situation on food security. Jumla is in the mountain, Dailekh and Dadeldhura are in the hill, and Kailali in the Tarai (plain). Jumla is accessible only by air transport. Kailali has a good road network, while Dailekh and Dadeldhura are connected with road but lack road network in the district. Basic characteristics of all the four districts shedding some light on the food security situation are presented in Table 2.1. The salient features emanating from the table are as follows.

Table 2.1: Background of Study Districts

District	No of HHs	Population		Pop. GR (%)	Literacy Rate (%)	Average Farm Size*	Food**		
		Total	Eco. Active				Production Total Edible (MT)	Requirement (MT)	Balance (MT)
Dailekh	41,140	225,201	50.1	1.85	47.4	0.86	30,154	45,040	-14,886
Jumla	15,850	89,427	46.3	1.65	32.4	0.93	10,357	17,885	-7,528
Dadeldhura	21,980	126,162	50.1	1.89	51.6	1.93	23,527	25,232	-1,705
Kailali	94,430	616,697	47.2	3.9	52.1	0.74	130,454	111,005	19,449

Source: Population Census 2001. * Sample Agriculture Census 1991. ** Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (figures for 2001).

- Three mountain and hill districts are perpetually food deficit districts, and the terai district is food surplus. The magnitude of deficit is quite high in Jumla (42%) and Dailekh (33%). The deficit is less than 10 percent in Dadeldhura, but Kailali enjoys a surplus in the tune of 14 percent. Kailali has always been a surplus food producer (Fig 2.1).
- The average farm size in Dailekh and Jumla are below the national average of about



one hectare. In Dadeldhura, the farm size is almost double the national average. Farm productivity is low in the hills owing to rugged terrain; Dadeldhura enjoys less deficit because of large average farm size.

- c. Consistent to the food surplus/deficit situation, the population growth in the mountain and hill districts is much less than the national average of 2.3 percent. The low growth is due to out-migration of individuals and households in search of better opportunities generally in the terai districts and in India. In Kailali, the population growth rate is close to double the national average. It receives emigrants mainly from adjoining hill districts.

Food deficit in the hill districts gets fulfilled mainly through three sources. The most important source is the traders who import food from the terai districts. The second source is the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) which procures food in the surplus districts and directs it to the deficit districts. And, thirdly, the food flow under 'Food for Work' especially run under the assistance of the World Food Programme contributes to the supply of food in the districts. In Kailali, the WFP has been availing food to engage ex-Kamaiyas in rural infrastructure creation. On the basis of discussions with knowledgeable individuals including the ex-District Development Committee (DDC) chairman, and local government officials, the tentative contribution in food supply by source is presented in Table 2.2. Clearly, private sector traders are the major source of meeting the deficit in Dailekh, whereas in Jumla, NFC is the major source of food supply. Keeping in view the magnitude of deficit, the role of 'Food for work' type source is limited. For example, only 2 and 5 percentage points of total food requirement is being met by this source in Dailekh and Dadeldhura, and in Jumla, respectively.

Table 2.2: Fulfillment of Food Deficit from Different Sources in Study Districts

District	Own production of the District (%)	Imported from Other Districts (%)	NFC (%)	Development Programmes
Dailekh	67	26	5	2
Jumla	58	12	25	5
Dadeldhura	93	5	0	2
Kailali	100	0	0	0

Source: Based on the discussion with various knowledgeable persons in the districts.

2.2 Food Security Situation

For assessing the impact of the current political situation of conflict (especially after the state of emergency was declared) on the food security situation in the districts, information on three important components of food security, viz., availability, access and utilization of food were collected. Information was collected from the key knowledgeable persons in the districts including the ex-DDC members, government line agency officials, local NGO personnel and school teachers in the district headquarters. In addition, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were held in two Village Development Committees (VDCs) of each district. Observations by researchers and informal discussions with key stakeholders including administrative and security personnel in the districts were instrumental in

understanding the process of change in food security situation. Thus, as the methodology allowed, the information base is qualitative rather than quantitative.

2.2.1 Food Availability

For analytical purpose, food availability is seen to comprise two sources: local production and imports of food in the districts, be it by traders or by institutional sources such as NFC.

Food Production

Food production in the districts, especially in those areas where Maoist activities are intense, is being adversely affected over last five years. The situation is said to have worsened after declaration of emergency. The survey findings in this regard are presented in what follows. However, the government data published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (Table 2.3) present a different picture than these findings. According to the government sources, in general, district level production is reported to have registered an increase over the last five years barring annual fluctuations in some years in case of specific districts. This is due to methodological flaws in such data estimation and extrapolation. For example, while collecting data, the heavily affected VDCs are generally left out.

Table 2.3: Cereal Grain Production in Edible Form by District

(in MT)


S.N.	District	1996/97	1197/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01
1.	Dailekh	23,442	27,661	25,768	27,534	30,154
2.	Jumla	7,830	8,028	6,377	10,643	10,357
3.	Dadeldhura	25,618	27,065	26,825	25,621	23,527
4.	Kailali	134,209	132,910	138,782	138,270	130,454

Source: Compiled from the data published by Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Note: Cereal grain includes rice, maize, wheat, millet and barley.

In the field studies of all the four districts, key informants were provided the list of VDCs in the district and were asked to rank VDCs in terms of intensity of impact of deteriorating security situation in the district on crop production. Three options were allowed: heavily affected, moderately affected and least/not affected. The assessment of

intensity of effect was based on subjective perceptions of the respondents guided by the extent of land left fallow, dislocation of farmers, migration of able bodied population and



intensity of Maoist activities in the VDCs.² The distribution of VDCs in the districts with varying intensity of impact of insecurity situation on food production is presented in Table 2.4. The proportion of VDCs reported as heavily affected was 40 percent in Dadeldhura, 33 percent in Jumla, 27 percent in Dailekh and 16 percent in Kailali. It is difficult to quantify the level of production decline, but discussion with the key informants suggested that, in heavily affected VDCs, the decline may be in the range of 10 to 15 percent, and in moderately affected VDCs, a decline of up to 10 percent. One clear evidence to be read in the table is that the impact is not uniform across the VDCs in the districts. The burden of insecurity situation is borne disproportionately by the districts as it is high in some areas while low in others.

Table 2.4: Production Situation in Districts after Emergency

District	No of Heavily Affected VDCs	No of Moderately Affected VDCs	No of Least Affected VDCs
Dailekh	15	33	8
Jumla	10	15	5
Dadeldhura	8	6	6
Kailali	7	24	13

Source: Based on the discussion with various knowledgeable persons.

The list of heavily affected VDCs with the number of households by district is presented in Table 2.5 and shown in Annex 1 Maps 6 to 9. The total number of households in the heavily affected VDCs of Dailekh, Jumla, Dadeldhura and Kailali are 23, 27.5, 28.6 and 9.2 percent of the total households in the respective districts. Discussions with key informants confirmed that, generally, these VDCs are located distant from the district headquarters and thus access of security forces was limited. In addition, many of the heavily affected VDCs are said to be the ones where the level of poverty and deprivation is high compared to the other VDCs of the districts even under normal situation.

Table 2.5: VDCs where Food Availability is Highly Affected after Emergency

SN.	District							
	Dailekh	No. of HHS	Jumla	No. of HHS	Dadeldhura	No. of HHS	Kailali	No. of HHS
1.	Padukasthan	843	Buvra Madichaur	214	Dewal Divayapur	941	Nigali	908
2.	Pipalkot	400	Ghode Mahadev	341	Koteli	768	Paundaun	655
3.	Bisalla	942	Kalika Khatu	115	Manilek	810	Sahajpur	1,162
4.	Kusapani	786	Kanak Sundari	189	Navadurga	594	Khairala	663
5.	Raniban	652	Kudari	721	Belapur	1,244	Sugarkhal	2,136
6.	Bhawani	332	Raralihi	407	Kaipalmandu	794	Godavari	2,473
7.	Baluwatar	520	Mabai Patarkhola	118	Ganeshpur	683	Moharyal	732
8.	Dwari	458	Malika Thata	474	Sameji	448	Total	8,729
9.	Kalika	379	Malika Bota	213	Total	6,282		
10.	Salleri	650	Tamti	546				
11.	Jagnath	427	Total	3,338				
12.	Pagnath	389						
13.	Katti	801						
14.	Lalikanda	616						
15.	Lyati Bindrasaini	1,155						
Total		9,350						

Source: Based on discussions with key informants.

² In fact, it was reiterated in the field, time and again, that the VDCs where Moists are active, all other enumerated factors are simultaneously active.

Process of Production Decline

Information was also collected through discussion and checklists on the process and reasons for negative impact on production. Given the nature of information, it is difficult to quantify and trace the causal relationship. Yet, the broad processes that have ensued impacting production negatively are described here.

- a. Many rural well-to-do farm families, who also are politically active, are leaving the villages in search of security. Their land is either being left fallow or is being cultivated by caretakers in the village.
- b. Widespread fleeing away of youths reported from highly affected VDCs. Migration for work in terai districts and also in India existed in the study districts in the past also. However, with the onset of insecurity, especially after declaration of emergency, this trend is said to have almost doubled. It is reported that the Maoists incite the young men to join their organization. Some have indeed joined, but others have opted to leave the villages. This has deprived the highly affected VDCs in the districts of human labor required for farming. It was reported during discussions that labor intensity in the farms has declined, cropping intensity has declined, and in some villages, farm terraces are being left fallow.
- c. During their activities and movements in the villages, Maoists require the villagers having surplus food to feed them. In addition, the surplus food is taken away as donation or by force. Hence, villagers are losing control over the surplus food. This has damaged the incentive to produce surplus. Surplus food, once a symbol of well-being and status, seems to have become a curse inviting the Maoist, and later the security personnel, enquiring why food was shared with the Maoists.
- d. The local administration has invariably restricted the transport and trade of iron goods including raw iron. Agricultural tools and implements are locally made and repaired by blacksmiths in their tiny workshops in the villages. Such workshops have been ordered to close down. Consequently, farmers are operating with dilapidated tools, and earnings of blacksmiths have significantly fallen.
- e. Movement of people and goods in the Maoist affected areas is drastically reduced. This has also reduced the supply of fertilizer and seeds, resulting in a lower level of production.
- f. Local level agriculture offices have been invariably shifted to the district headquarters due to fear of Maoist activities. Whatever meager extension and technological backstopping were available to the farmers before have been withdrawn.

The cumulative effects of the processes enumerated above have led to elimination of incentives to produce more in the villages. Food deficits have been aggravated, and availability of food as a necessary condition of food security has been impaired.

2.2.2 Food Through Market

Supply of food from within districts from the surplus producers and by the traders has been an important means of meeting food deficit in the deficit regions in the districts. The role of NFC and other sources are relatively small (Table 2.2) and these are meant for

targeted population vulnerable to acute food insecurity. Supply of food through the market has been severely hindered largely due to the fear of the Maoists or due to restriction by the district administration in the movement of food to the districts and within districts, from one place to another. The processes involved in curtailing the role of market supply in meeting food deficit are as follows.

- a. Decline in the local production has resulted into a reduction in the flow of food to the market. It has also reduced the practice of 'food' as wage good for wage payment.
- b. Trade and movement of food have been restricted by local administration. This measure was introduced with the aim of cutting the food supplies reaching the Maoists. In fact, as reported during discussions with key informants in the districts, such a strategy has imposed a double burden on the population. First, the availability of food through external sources has been curtailed. Second, whatever food is available at the local level has to be shared with the Maoists thus depleting the local supply. Food traders are instructed by the local administration not to sell in excess of 5 to 10 kilograms of food to individuals at a time. And the loads carried by individuals are checked by the security personnel to ensure compliance. Hence, movement of food from district headquarters and market centres to the interior villages are fully controlled. Discussion with traders revealed that the instructions are informal, and compliance is automatic, or else harassment ensues.
- c. Similar to food grains, readymade food items such as noodles, beaten rice and biscuits are also not allowed free movement and unrestricted trade. Traders are instructed by local administration not to sell in bulk to the villagers. Village petty shops have stopped selling such items as they do not get supply from district headquarters and major market centres in the district.
- d. Food supply from NFC has witnessed a setback both due to reduced stock in the NFC district offices, and withdrawal of NFC sales outlets outside the district headquarters. Irregularity in the transport of food grains to Dailekh and Jumla has intensified due to insecurity situation. Similarly, sales outlets outside the headquarters have been moved to the headquarters because of fear of insecurity. This, coupled with restrictions on individuals carrying food, has deprived the needy rural households in the villages access to food.
- e. Food supply tied to development work – 'Food for Work' type, though on a limited scale, is reported to be reaching the target areas and target people. Occasionally, hassles in administration of such food were reported, but the disturbances are far less/severe than what is faced in the food supply through private traders. In Jumla and Dailekh in 'Food for Work' activities, it was reported that, on many occasions, Maoist activists would also participate in the work, and bag their due share of food. It was not possible to quantify the degree of such participation. But, such incidences definitely curtail food going to the needy target population. In general, the 'Food for Education (FFE)' activities were also reported to be in operation with little hindrance.

2.2.3 Food Access

Access to food implies that one has either physical or economic access to food. Physical access to food is achieved either from own production or from the market, and economic

access to food is related to the income level of people by which they can acquire required food. Information pertaining to the physical access was presented in Section 2.2. Both own production and income level of the people in the study districts are decreasing due to decrease in agricultural production and reduced employment opportunities within the districts.

This has reduced people's access to food in areas where problem of insecurity is intense. In particular, households dependent on wage employment and market supply of food grains are being adversely affected. Information on the impact of insecurity situation in terms of reducing access to food is presented in Table 2.6. The information was obtained from key informants' survey for all VDCs of all the four districts. Problem in the VDCs in terms of three causal factors, viz., reduction in wage works, reduction in the sale of local products and reduction in remittances are presented in the table.




Table 2.6: Percentage of VDCs with Problem in Accessing Food by Reason

S.N.	District	Reduction in Access to Food		
		Wage work Reduced	Sale of Local Production Reduced	Decrease in Remittance
1.	Dailekh	30.0	14.0	52.0
2.	Jumla	14.0	95.0	43.0
3.	Dadeldhura	40.0	19.0	45.0
4.	Kailali	16.0	39.0	50.0

Source: Based on discussions with key informants.

In addition to the usual migration trend for work in India, a significant number of additional people have migrated since the insecurity situation has intensified in the districts. The main reasons for such increase in migration are basically two, and are interrelated. First, people dependent on local wage employment opportunities are unable

to find such opportunities and hence have left home in search of employment. Second, especially the young population is leaving the villages because of the fear of being inducted in the Maoist group. During the key informant survey and informal discussions in the districts, it was reported that the

Food Insecurity Problem is Serious

There's been an exodus of villagers from the five districts of the Karnali Zone. "Every one between the ages of 10 and 50 has left" says Deep Bahadur Shahi, former Kalikot DDC chairman. "Women till the fields, but can't produce enough. Besides we have 'guests' to feed," Shahi says referring to Maoists.

Source: *Nepali Times*, 20-26 September 2002.

exodus of migration has almost doubled from several troubled areas of the districts over a period of one year. The Maoists have been spreading the slogan “one family one volunteer”, and request, and ultimately force, young population to join their group. Consequently, though the Maoists have lured some, others have opted to leave the villages. It is however difficult to quantify the number of people leaving villages. Discussions in the District Development Committees in the districts revealed that since the declaration of the state of emergency, the number of people seeking identification letters has gone up sharply. Such identifications are required while travelling to other districts and across the border, especially after the imposition of the state of emergency.

Favorite destinations of the migrants are reported to be Nainital, Simla, Kullu, Manali, and Almora of India where the climate is similar to that of the Nepal hills. There, people work as porters, and labourers in horticultural farms and elsewhere. It is natural to expect that the income level of

households sending migrants should have increased.

However, interactions during the fieldwork revealed a different situation. Nepali people who were contacted in Nainital³ reported that they earn reasonably well there (Indian Rs 100 to 200 per day), but it is very difficult to send money to their families residing in

Nepal. As there is no formal system of sending money to rural areas of Nepal, one has to send it through friends or relatives going home on leave. Security checking on Indian borders and in Nepal is very tight after the state of emergency was declared. They reported that the security personnel often take the money carried by the returning migrants. While doing so, it was reported, charges are laid on the returning migrants that they are carrying the money to deliver to the Maoists. In case the migrants are able to secure their money from security personnel, Maoists take their money forcefully who also search the body of new comers to the district. What ever be the case, they go back home empty handed. The ultimate victims are the family members staying home who are deprived of remittances. Consequently, even when the migration flow has increased, the remittance seems to have decreased. This phenomenon has eroded the access to food in the districts.

The third causal factor that has contributed to reduction in the income and thus access to food was reported to be the increasing difficulty in harvesting and marketing of local

Man Bahadur Surrendered Years Earning to Police in Badhani

Himalaya Times Reporter
Saun 23 (August 8, 2002)

Man Bahadur of Gulmi district was compelled to surrender his earning of years to the Indian police in the Badhani boarder police post. After a threat of handing over to the Nepal police with a charge of being Maoist, Man Bahadur surrender IRs 30,000.

After India's adoption of policy to hand over the Maoist to the Nepal Government, the returning Nepali workers are being virtually looted in the Indian boarders.

³ After learning that migration is at an increase, researchers traveled to Nainital of India and met Nepali people working there. The workers were not cooperative initially as they feared the researchers spying for Maoists or for the government. But as discussions progressed, and they were convinced from the researchers' familiarity with their districts, only then they shared their concerns and experiences.

products (herbal products in Jumla, Dailekh and Dandeldhura) and vegetables (Dailekh and Dandeldhura). In case of herbal products, collection and marketing is said to have moved to the hands of the Maoists who allow only those loyal to them participate in the activities. It was reported that income from the sale of livestock, horticulture and non-timber forest products has drastically fallen.

The followings are the other reasons that have a direct relation to the deteriorating access to food in the districts.

- Land less households are the most food insecure group in regard to food access. According to the Population Census 2001, of the total households, about 7 percent in each of Dailekh, Jumla and Dadeldhura and 19 percent in Kailali districts are landless. The major source of income of these people is agricultural labour and remittance income. Decreased farming intensity and thus reduction in local employment opportunities and difficulty in receiving remittance income have put the remaining household members (family members not migrating) in vulnerable situation.
- The population of Dalits (*Kami, Damai and Sarki*) is also quite significant in all the study districts. About one-fifth to one-fourth of the total population in these districts are Dalits. The income level of this group is lowest and the living standard is relatively worse. Due to restrictions on occupational activities (for example, blacksmith), coupled with reduction in local employment opportunities and reduction in remittance, these households are facing increased level of food insecurity.
- Especially, in Kailali district, the ex bonded labourers (Kamaiyas) are the most disadvantaged group of households with respect to food access. The government has provided them a small piece of land and resettled them generally away from their original villages. On one hand, the provided land is not enough even to grow food that can meet a couple of months' food requirement, and on the other, employment opportunities in the new places are meager.

Low Wages Due to Over-supply Of Labourers

Employment opportunity is not coping and wages have nose dived in Pithuraghad of Uttaranchal, India due to over supply of youths displaced due to fear of insecurity in mid and far west regions of Nepal.

About six hundred Nepalese labourers used to work in Pithauragadh, and almost the same number has been added in recent months, and labour market has been affected. Labourers report that day's salary has come down from IRs 160 to IRs 80.


The influx of Nepalese youths has accelerated in Indian cities to escape from insecurity situation in the villages. Youths of age 14 to 20 years are in majority among the migrants. One youth from Rinchaupata of Darchula said, "Have come to avoid the adverse situation in the village, but the work is still not secure. Now working as porter fetches only half the wages (income)". He shares a room with friends in Stadium Road. 'It was difficult to remain in the village, here the wage income is low.' the youth said.....

Source: Kantipur Daily, August 10, 2002, reported by Shyam Bhatta.

2.2.4 Food Utilization

Food utilization is mainly concerned with the capacity to change food into energy. For the present purpose, two aspects of food utilization were considered. First, the general availability of basic health services in the districts; and second, the impact on the food processing facilities in the districts. Information on the impact of current insecurity situation was obtained at the VDC level.

Using information obtained through key informants' survey, the VDCs of the districts were classified according to the problems in case of basic health facilities and problems in food grain processing (Table 2.7). Withdrawal of health posts and/or lack of health personnel and medicine are reported to have



aggravated the problem in a large number of VDCs, especially in the hill districts. Similarly, lack of power or lack of diesel has obstructed food processing in the mills. Indiscriminate destruction of power supply sources and restriction in the movement of fuel has created difficulties in mechanized food processing. Over the years, due to the availability of power and/or fuel run mills, villagers had not maintained the traditional water mills. Now that the modern food processing facilities are not in operation, water mills are being revived.

Table 2.7: Impact on Food Utilization in VDCs

(% of VDCs)			
S.N.	District	Problem in Basic Health	Problems in Food Processing
1.	Dailekh	63.0	72.0
2.	Jumla	36.0	45.0
3.	Dadeldhura	71.0	86.0
4.	Kailali	20.0	34.0

Source: Based on discussions with key informants.

2.2.5 Results of Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussions were conducted in two VDCs of each study district. Ex-VDC officials, school teachers and people from different political parties and local farmers

participated in the meetings. In each of such meetings, 20-25 people participated. The impact of Maoist insurgency and dense presence of security forces in the different aspects of livelihood including the situation of food security in the respective areas was discussed. The outcomes of FGD are presented in the following sub-sections.

Change in Food Security Situation

The changes in food security situation from five years ago and now was discussed. Percentage distribution of households with surplus food for all year, six months, three months and less than three months for each VDC was estimated (Table 2.8). The percentage of households who had enough food stocks for the whole year compared to five years ago was reported to have decreased in all VDCs where FGD was conducted. Similarly, percentage of households with enough food stocks for 6 months and three months have also decreased; but the percentage of households with enough food stocks for less than three months has increased. This suggests that the overall food security situation in all the study districts has deteriorated. The main cause of such deterioration, however, is due to decrease in the market availability of food crops as movement in food items is restricted in the Maoist hit areas. Another reason for the emergence of such a situation is due to the decrease in production of food crops in these areas due to lack of extension services, unavailability of inputs on time and decrease in labor supply due to migration. The incentive to produce surplus has sharply fallen due to the tendency of looting food by the Maoists.

Table 2.8: Food Security Situation

(% of Households in the VDCs)

S.N.	District	All Year		6 Months		3 Months		Less than 3 Month	
		5 Yrs Ago	Now	5 Yrs Ago	Now	5 Yrs Ago	Now	5 Yrs Ago	Now
1.	Dailekh								
	a. Kalika	15	10	11	15	18	20	56	55
	b. Kusapani	30	21	40	35	20	18	10	26
2.	Jumla								
	a. Kartik Swami	15	13	60	50	20	22	5	15
	b. Chandan Nath	15	11	50	45	20	18	15	23
3.	Dadeldhura								
	a. Bagarkot	50	40	30	40	10	10	10	10
	b. Koteli	30	20	30	30	30	40	10	10
4.	Kailali								
	a. Patharaiya	55	40	20	22	10	19	15	19
	b. Munuwa	52	55	13	15	25	19	10	11

Source: FGD in respective VDCs.

Coping Mechanism against Food Insecurity

People had ways of coping with food insecurity situation in the study districts. The mostly used means are labour work, loan, livestock selling, land selling, productive asset selling and migration. The percentage distribution of households adopting these

mechanisms is shown in Table 2.9. Clearly, selling labor and migration are the preferred options. But, as discussed in the earlier sections, problem in sending remittance and reduction in local employment opportunities have eroded the contribution of these options.

Table 2.9: Coping Mechanism of Food Insecurity

(% of Households)

S.N.	District	More Labour Work	Loan	Livestock Selling	Land Selling	Productive Asset Selling	Migration
1.	Dailekh						
	a. Kalika	40	16	5	-	5	34
	b. Kusapani	30	15	15	2	3	35
2.	Jumla						
	a. Kartik Swami	35	2	-	1	37	25
	b. Chandan Nath	40	12	13	6	10	19
3.	Dadeldhura						
	a. Bagarkot	40	15	5	5	5	15
	b. Koteli	50	30	5	-	5	10
4.	Kailali						
	a. Patharaiya	85	5	2	1	5.5	1.5
	b. Munuwa	88	3	5	2	1.5	0.5

Source: FGD in respective VDCs.

Migration Pattern

There are two categories of persons who migrate for security reasons. In the first category fall politically engaged persons who may be targeted by Maoists. The second category constitutes the poor people who could not manage their livelihood due to the decrease in income generating activities in their areas. The first group of persons has migrated to relatively safer places and are waiting for the situation to improve. The second group of persons migrated mainly to find employment. These people have generally gone to Indian cities. There, they work as porters, guards and in similar unskilled labor intensive works. Some other people migrated to other districts inside Nepal in search of work. Details about the migration pattern of the study districts due to security reason is presented in Table 2.10. As can be seen in the table, migration patterns vary across the districts, and seasonal migration is invariably high in all the VDCs.

Youth Going to India for Work Are in Problem

Source: Space Time, Saun 21, 2059 (August 6, 2002)

The trend of fleeing to India has intensified after the Maoists made it compulsory to send one person from each household to their group in the remote villages of Dailekh district. Because the local governments (VDC and DDC) have no representatives, the youths fleeing for security and employment are in problem. The local representatives used to provide required letters, but now local unites are without representative as their tenure was not extended.....

Table 2.10: Migration Pattern Due to Security Reason

(% of working population)					
S. N.	District	Seasonal Migration to India	Seasonal Migration to other areas of Nepal	Migration for Employment	Permanent Migration
1.	Dailekh				
	a. Kalika	7	2	1	0
	b. Kusapani	41	11	1	4
2.	Jumla				
	a. Kartik Swami	1	6	2	0
	b. Chandan Nath	4	15.8	3	4
3.	Dadeldhura				
	a. Bagarkot	30	20	5	2
	b. Koteli	20	30	3	5
4.	Kailali				
	a. Patharaiya	10	8	4	1
	b. Munuwa	5	12	2	4

Source: FGD in respective VDCs.

Withdrawal of Development Work

One of the issues discussed during the FGD was how the development works have been affected by the security situation. It was reported that development works have also been affected due to security reason in all the study districts. Many projects have withdrawn their activities. The names of major projects that have been closed during the last 5 years are listed in Table 2.11. Such closures have deprived the local populace from accessing development interventions, and also off-farm employment opportunities.

Table 2.11: Development Work withdrawn in last 5 Years Due to Security Reason

S.N	District	Work Closed Down
1.	Dailekh	1. Non-formal Education Programme of UMN 2. Agricultural Development Programme run by SAPROS- Nepal 3. Community Development Programme of Rural Self-help Development Centre funded by HELVATAS
2.	Jumla	1. Karnali Community Skill Training Project of UMN 2. Electricity Plant of CSD/CBED 3. Drinking Water and Irrigation Programme of CSD/CBED
3.	Dadeldhura	1. Social Mobilization Programme of CBED
4.	Kailali	1. Electricity Connection in Different VDCs 2. Road and Bridge Construction Programmes 3. School Building Programmes 4. Food for work programme of WFP was also closed down for few months when Maoist had looted their food grains. However, they have resumed their programme now.

Source: Based on the discussion with Key informants.

2.3 WFP Activities

The World Food Programme, though on a limited scale in view of food deficiency in general (see Table 2.2) and the emerging food insecurity situation due to conflict situation in particular, has been supporting the study districts through effective food aid initiatives. Food aid relevant to easing food insecurity is channeled for rural infrastructure creation and provision of meals for primary school children (Annex 2 &3). Under infrastructure building initiatives, local labourers are deployed and paid in terms of food grains. This initiative has contributed and has potential to contribute in easing the mounting food insecurity situation in the districts. Discussion with the key informants and the local government official revealed the following facts and the likely measures for improving WFP initiatives.

- a. The density of WFP involvement and the quantum of food aid need to be augmented. For example, in the current year (2002), WFP food aided activities are in operation only in 10 VDCs out of 55 VDCs in Dailekh. And there too, the workers in average got employed for 5 to 7 days. The story is the same in other districts as well. Especially, in the currently aggravating food insecurity situation, increase in the number of VDCs covered under the programme and duration of work per worker are called for.
- b. WFP food aid has witnessed occasional mismanagement in the hands of local administration. The problem seems to lie on transportation of food to destinations, and dispensing of food to the workers in construction activities. Political and administrative interferences are responsible for the problem. Such interferences need to be minimized. The best way to reach beneficiaries is to involve them in transportation of food to the destination and directly engage them in labour activities.
- c. Similar to the problems faced by traders and others involved in the transfer of food grains in the districts, difficulties were faced in the movement of food aid from local administration and security side. Also, the Maoists have been critical of aid administration. Given the gravity of food insecurity problem, both the sides need to practice restraint and allow free passage and use of food aid by WFP and its partners for intended use.

Chapter 3

Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 Conclusions

Based on the analysis presented in the foregoing chapters, the following are the major conclusions regarding the three components of food security, namely, food availability, food access and food utilization.

1. Food production in the districts, especially in areas of the districts where Maoist activities are intense, is declining over last five years. The situation has worsened after the state of emergency was declared. The level of production decline is in the range of 10 to 15 percent in heavily affected VDCs. Similarly, supply of food through the market has also been severely hindered largely due to the fear of the Maoists, and due to the restriction in the movement of food to the districts and within districts by the district administration.
2. Food supply tied to development work – 'Food for Work' type, though on a limited scale, is reported to be reaching the target areas and target people. Occasionally, hassles in administration of such food were reported, but the disturbances are far less/severe than what is faced in food supply through private traders.
3. Both own production and income levels of people in the study districts are decreasing due to the decrease in agricultural production and reduction in the employment opportunities within the districts. This has reduced people's access to food in areas where the problem of insecurity is most intense. In particular, households dependent on wage employment and market supply of food grains are being adversely affected.
4. Withdrawal of health posts and/or lack of health personnel and medicine are reported to have aggravated the problem for people in large numbers in VDCs, especially in the hill districts. Similarly, lack of power or lack of diesel (fuel) has obstructed food processing in the mills. Indiscriminate destruction of power supply sources and restriction in the movement of fuel has created difficulties in mechanized food processing.

3.2 Recommendations

Food insecurity situation in the study districts has two dimensions. First, except Kailali, the plain district, all the other three mountain and hill districts are chronically food deficit. Second, the deteriorating conflict situation in the districts has further deepened the problem of food insecurity. This study has attempted to enhance understanding of the second dimension, the heavily affected areas and groups of the districts were identified and the processes of deterioration in food insecurity situation were traced. The recommendations are made below keeping in mind the aggravated food insecurity

situation due to the emerging conflict situation. Hence, the recommendations need not be specific to the studied districts.

1. The declining incentives to produce surplus needs to be restored. Decline in production in already food deficit regions has the potential to evolve itself into an alarming situation in terms of food availability, thus jeopardizing food security in the districts. The Maoists should restrain from their "food extraction" activities.
2. Food production is also being affected by low intensity of inputs use and lack of extension and technological support. Restriction on marketing of metal and production of agricultural tools should not continue. As it seems, such restrictions have adversely affected the local farmers and not the intended Maoists. Similarly, extension and other services should be expanded rather than withdrawn and confined to the district headquarters.
3. Regulation and restrictions on external food supply by traders should be reviewed, and movement of food to villages should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Such restrictions have not caused starvation among the Maoists. Rather, they have aggravated the food insecurity situation in the villages. Similarly, NFC should augment its food supply in the affected districts and ensure that the supply reaches the most needy areas and people. By far, the NFC supply is not taking into account the added requirement emanating from the conflict situation.
4. Food flows for development works at the moment is meager in view of the food deficit situation in the districts (refer to Table 2.2). In addition, the insecurity situation has further fuelled food insecurity. Such flows should be increased letting more and more food to reach the most affected regions and villages in the districts. Both the administration and Maoists should allow free passage and fair distribution of food to the real beneficiaries as determined by the stakeholders such as WFP.
5. The accelerating out-migration trend in the districts is the result of fear of insecurity and lack of employment opportunities in the villages. Acceleration of infrastructure building activities such as roads and irrigation systems will have a dual impact: food reaching the poor and food insecure groups, and retention of likely out-migrants. Such activities should be intensified in the areas of the districts which are most affected by the current conflict situation.
6. With the increased out-migration from the districts, one would have expected concomitant increase in the flow of remittances. However, due to fear of money being extorted by security personnel on either side of the Nepal-India border and by the Maoists (money is brought in person), the flow of remittances seems to have curtailed. Hence, there is a need to encourage and facilitate money transfers by the migrants to their families using banking or postal systems. Non-government organizations can play a key role in facilitating such transfers.
7. The information available through the media (after field works in the districts were completed) indicates that the insecurity situation and also the food security in the districts are further deteriorating. In many districts, production may further decline due to unfavorable rain or weather conditions. All care needs to be taken to prevent a famine situation. For this, in all critically conflict affected districts, provision of humanitarian relief distribution is called for. Such distribution should

- be handled by local administration in close collaboration with agencies such as WFP with least political interference.
8. In addition to the above recommendations, seeking long term solutions in resolving the conflict situation and increased social and economic development interventions in the districts are essential. Indeed, poverty and deprivation in the districts have served as fertile grounds on which the Maoists were born and have expanded their activities. Increased development interventions and inclusion of the excluded in the development process are essential to ensure a lasting resolution of the problems.
 9. Food insecurity situation in the conflict affected districts should be continuously monitored. This would help in designing programmes and relief measures for coping with the situation. A list of major indicators that would be helpful to gauge the food insecurity situation is provided below.
 - a. Flow of local production (surplus) in the market place (e.g., district headquarters).
 - b. Trend in supply of chemical fertilizer.
 - c. Trend in migration: number of 'identification certificates' issued by the district administration.⁴
 - d. NFC food distribution in district headquarters and outside.
 - e. Flow of food grains for employment and relief purposes.
 - f. Food imports (from other districts) by traders.
 - g. Trend in flow of remittances-Indian rupees exchanged in the local banks.
 - h. Drop-out rates in the schools.

⁴ Monitoring of migration for work can also be done by requiring the outgoing and incoming migrants at the border crossing points. The information can be of use also to monitor other aspects such as problem of HIV/AIDS.

References

- APROSC, 1998. Poverty Situation Analysis of Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal
- ASD, 1999. Statistical Information on Nepalese Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture, Kathmandu, Nepal
- CBS, 1993. Sample Census of Agriculture, 1991, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, Nepal
- CBS, 1997. Nepal Living Standards Survey, 1996, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, Nepal
- CBS, 1998. A Compendium on Environmental Statistics 1998 Nepal, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, Nepal
- CBS, 2002. Population Census 2001, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, Nepal
- FAO, 1999. Selected Indicators of Food and Agriculture Development in Asia-Pacific Region, Food and Agriculture Organization, Regional Office, Bangkok
- MOF, 1999. Economic Survey, 1998/99, Kathmandu Nepal
- MOF, 2001. Economic Survey, 2000/01, Kathmandu Nepal
- MOH, 1996. Nepal Family Health Survey 1996, New Era, Kathmandu, Nepal
- NPC, 1997. A Survey of Income, Employment, Income Distribution and Consumption Pattern in Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal
- NPC, 1998. The Ninth Plan (1997-2002), Kathmandu, Nepal
- NPC/UNICEF, 1995. Nepal Multiple Indicator Surveillance (NMIS), Kathmandu, Nepal
- NRA, 1999. Nepal District Profile, 1999, Kathmandu, Nepal
- NSAC, 1998. Nepal Human Development Report 1998, Kathmandu, Nepal
- Shakya, P. B. and P. B. Singh, 2000. Food Insecurity and Vulnerability in Nepal: An Issue Paper, World Food Program, Lalitpur, Nepal
- Sharma, S. and Poudel, S. K., 2001. Policy and Strategy for Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Household Food Security in Nepal (Unpublished Report Prepared for FAO)
- WFP, 2001. Food Security and Vulnerability Profile 2000, Kathmandu, Nepal
- World Food Summit, 1996. Rome Declaration on World Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, FAO, Rome

Institutional Sources of Food Supply

1. Nepal Food Corporation (NFC)

NFC is a semi-government institution with its head office in Kathmandu and several district level offices in food deficit and food surplus areas. It purchases food grains from food surplus areas and sells in deficit areas at subsidized prices. NFC has district level offices in all the study districts. The Dadeldhura office of NFC, however, is working in low profile after the completion of Dhangadhi-Dadeldhura black-topped road. There is a general rule of NFC that its district level offices are closed down after the connection of district headquarter with an all weather road. In Dailekh and Jumla, NFC is operating but is unable to meet even a fraction of the deficit in these districts. Kailali office of NFC just purchases food grains from farmers and stores in its godown and sends to deficit districts as per their demand.

People generally are not satisfied with the quality of food grains supplied by NFC. They prefer to purchase food grains from the market if it is readily available. Only when there are no other options, they go for NFC grains.

2. World Food Programme

The World Food Programme (WFP) is a UN agency that provides food assistance only when and where food consumption is inadequate to lead a healthy and productive life (WFP, Nepal 2001). Identification of food insecure areas and efficient food aid planning, targeting and preparing intervention framework are the prime work of the mission. The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) unit under WFP mainly does this part of work.

In Nepal, WFP is providing food aid to vulnerable groups in 38 districts of the country basically through three different programmes. These programmes are Rural Community Infrastructure Works (RCIW), Food for Education (FFE), and Mother and Child Health Care (MCHC).

Rural Community Infrastructure Works (RCIW)

RCIW assists poor households to create and maintain physical assets that improve food availability and facilitate the social mobilization process. Under this programme, individuals and communities more ably and actively pursue their own development interests from which they get better physical access to food and markets, increased and diversified income and employment opportunities, and better health and nutrition. RCIW targets the most food deficit areas of Nepal. During January 2001 to December 2002, WFP plans to provide 37,500 MT of rice from which 300,000 people (1.3 percent of the total population) are to benefit under RCIW. Yet, the annual per capita rice provision for the beneficiaries comes to merely 62 kilograms. Assuming a 5-member family of participating members, the per capita food provision through RCIW further comes down

to only 12 kilograms. Clearly, the density of RCIW and intensity of RCIW provisioned food are far from the ones to make significant difference in the food deficit regions. RCIW is expected to continue this programme until 2006 in the remote and food deficit hill and mountain districts of Nepal's mid- and far-western development regions.

Food for Education (FFE)

Under FFE, hot mid-day food snack is provided to schoolchildren of primary schools. The specific objectives of this programme are to:

- improve class attendance of school children and reduce afternoon absenteeism,
- increase girls' enrollment and retention,
- enhance the attention span and learning capacity of students by relieving short-term hunger,
- reduce the intensity and prevalence of intestinal parasitic infections in school children by de-worming, and
- enhance parents' participation in the programme and heighten their awareness of gender issues.

The total number of beneficiaries in this programme is 250,000. A total of 18,150 MT of wheat-soya blended cereal, 3,205 MT of sugar and 2,135 MT of vegetable oil was contributed by WFP during April 1998 to August 2002 in 16 districts.

Mother and Child Health Care (MCHC)

Under MCHC activity, WFP is providing a take home ration of 7.5 kg of fortified blended food to expectant and nursing mothers (until 6 months after delivery) and 6 kg to children between 6 months and three years of age. This programme is planned to implement in 110 VDCs of ten districts. The total number of beneficiaries from this programme would be 45,229 expectant and nursing mothers and 133,116 children of 6 to 36 months. Total nutrimix- fortified blended food distributed under this programme-- is 13,655 MT and that of vegetable oil is 513 MT.

General Feeling of the People about WFP Programmes

In all the study districts, the attitude of the people towards WFP programme was found to be extremely positive. People realize that these programmes are beneficial without any doubt to develop infrastructure on one hand, and solve the problem of food insecurity of poverty stricken people, on the other. The only complaint the study team received from the people about WFP was that its coverage is thin.

Table 1 : WFP Programme in Study Districts

District	Eco-Region	WFP's Activity	FSVP Cluster	Previous study	Chronic Vuln. Index
Dailekh	Hill	R+F	Mid-western hill	No	High
Jumla	Mountain	R	Karnali Transhimalaya	Yes(FSVP)	High
Dadeldhura	Hill	R+F+M	Far Western hill	No	Medium
Kailali	Terai	R	Far & Mid Western Terai	Yes(FSVP)	Medium

R= Rural Community Infrastructure Works

F= Food for Education

M= Mother and Child Health Care

FSVP= Food security and vulnerability profile

Persons Involved in the Field

District: Dailekh

Facilitators:

Mr. Soorya Bahadur Shahi

Mr. Tilak P. Sharma

Persons Contacted:

S.N.	Name	Post/Address
1.	Lal Bdr. Lamichhane	Teacher, Pipalkot
2.	Prakash Kumar Salami	Lakandra-1
3.	Mani Ram Jaisi	Paduka-2
4.	Tek Bdr. Khand	Ex DDC Chairman
5.	Tilak Prasad Jaisi	Layani Brindasaini-1
6.	Krishna Bahadur Shahi	DDC, Dailekh
7.	Jagat Jang Thapa	Narayan Municipality
8.	Surya Bahadur Shahi	Ex DDC Vice Chairman
9.	Loman Sharma	Ex DDC Member
10.	Rabindra Raj Sharma	Ex Mayor, Narayan Municipality

District: Jumla

Facilitators:

Mr. Nav Raj Acharya

Ms. Usha Neupane

Persons Contacted:

S.N.	Name	Post/Address
1.	Shakuntala Hamal	Kudari VDC
2.	Chakra Bdr Shahi	VDC Member, Kudari
3.	Hasta Bahadur Budha	VDC Ex Chairman, Kudari
4.	Seba Sharan Hamal	Birat VDC
5.	Agni Raj Upadhaya	Birat VDC
6.	Dhan Lal Hamal	Kanak Sundari VDC
7.	Chhabi Shahi	Chandan Nath VDC-8
8.	Rati Man Bista	Patmara-9
9.	Chhetra Bdr. Senjuwal	Acting LDO
10.	Dip Bahadur Shahi	Rara Lihi VDC
11.	Dhan Prasad Devkota	Depal Gaon VDC
12.	Tanka Bahadur Mahat	Mahat Gaon VDC

District: Dadeldhura

Facilitators:

Ms. Nira Jairu

Mr. Siddha Raj Paneru

Persons Contacted:

S.N.	Name	Post/Address
1.	Bikram Bdr. Shahi	Politician
2.	Chhatra Sanwad	Journalist
3.	Rajendra Sanwad	School Teacher
4.	Brinda Kumar Basnet	Politician
5.	Jit Raj Bhatta	School Teacher
6.	Ram Chandra Chataut	Chairman Sanskrit College
7.	Govinda Prasad Pant	Chairman, RPP
8.	Tula Ram Bohora	Ex DDC Member
9.	Padam Bahadur Pal	Politician
10.	Surendra Air	Chairman, Red Cross Society
11.	Gajendra Bahadur Shahi	Ex DDC Chairman

District: Kailali

Facilitators:

Mr. Phiru Lal Chaudhary

Mr. Ram Prasad Chaudhary

Persons Contacted:

S.N.	Name	Post/Address
1.	Tika Ram Mahato	EX VDC Chairman, Joshipur
2.	Tej Ram Chaudhari	Thapapur
3.	Dharma Raj Pandey	Dhangadhi
4.	Nanda Lal Joshi	Dhangadhi
5.	Dinesh Chandra Subedi	Phoolbari VDC-5
6.	Nar Pati Pandey	School Teacher
7.	Ratan Thapa	Balia VDC-8
8.	Sher Bahadur	Chairman, Press Chautari
9.	Kali Bahadur Rawal	Tikapur-13
10.	Dharma Jeet Shahi	Tikapur-8

Checklist for District Agriculture Development Office

1. Name of the district : 2. Total No. of VDCs :
3. Total No. of Ilakas : 4. Total No. of service centres
5. Total No. of sub-centres

6. Area and production of different food crops for last 5 years

Food crops	1996/97		1997/98		1998/1999		1999/2000		2000/2001	
	Area	Prodn	Area	Prodn	Area	Prodn	Area	Prodn	Area	Prodn
Paddy										
Maize										
Wheat										
Millet										
Barley										
Potato										

7. How this district fulfils the food requirements ? Give details as specified in the following table.

Sources of food	Percentage of substitution	Remarks
1. Production of the district itself		
2. Import from other districts (including Terai)		
3. From NFC		
4. Food for work and other similar programmes		
5. Others (specify)		

8. Have you noticed any change in food supply situation during last 5 years ? What type of change you have observed ? Please describes as specified in the table below?

Description	Status (decrease or increase)	Reasons of change in status
1. Food production situation in the district		
2. Food import from outside		
3. NFC supply		
4. Food received from development programmes		

9. What change you have noticed in the following socio-economic condition of the people of the district ?

Description	Status (decrease or increase)	Reasons of change in status
1. Income level of the people		
2. Migration pattern to India		
3. Migration pattern to abroad		
4. Migration pattern to other parts of the country		
5. Working pattern of NGO/INGO		
6. Working pattern of development programmes		
7. Income from wage		
8. Input supply (fertilizer, seed etc.)		
9. Food availability in the market		

10. Could you arrange all VDCs of the district in three categories as specified below ?

Vulnerable VDCs from the prospect of household food security

Less vulnerable VDCs from the prospect of household food security

Surplus VDCs from the prospect of household food security

11. Can introducing some programmes change the situation in vulnerable and less vulnerable district ? What type of programmes ? Discuss.

Checklist for District Development Committee

1. Name of the district : 2. Total No. of VDCs :

3. Total No. of Ilakas :

4. Population and No. of households by VDCs (use another sheet)

S.No.	Name of VDC	Population		No. of HHs
		Male	Female	

5. Please categorize the VDCs as

- I. Vulnerable VDCs in the prospect of food security
- II. Less vulnerable VDCs in the prospect of food security
- III. Food surplus VDCs

6. How the food requirement of the district is fulfilled ?

S.No.	Food source	% fulfilled before 5 yrs	% fulfilled as of now	Remarks
1.	Own production			
2.	From development programmes			
3.	NFC specify			
4.	Import from other district			
5.	Others (specify)			

7. Name of the programmes from which food crops are received e.g. food for work, food for education etc.
Also give amount of food received during last 5 years.

S.No.	Name of the Programem	Donor institution	1	2	3	4	5
1.							
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							

8. Seasonal migration and migration for employment

S.No.	Description	No. persons		Change in the pattern during last 5 years	Remittance/ person/year
		Male	Female		
1.	Seasonal migration to India				
2.	Seasonal migration to other parts of the country				
3.	Migration for employment to abroad				
4.	Migration for employment to India				
5.	Permanent migration				

9. Have any development programmes have been withdrawn from this district ? Name them.

S.No.	Name of the programme withdrawn	Proposed duration	Reason of withdrawal
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

10. Name the INGO and NGO working in the district.

S.No.	Name of INGO and NGO	Work area	No. of years working in the district

11. Have any NGO/INGO withdrawn their services from the district ? Give following details.

S.No.	Name of NGO/INGO withdrawn	Work area	Reason of withdrawal

12. Is there any change in market pattern of food crops in the district during last 5 years ?
What type of change ?

13. Is there any change in the supply pattern of inputs such as fertilizer, seeds etc in the district ? What type of change ? Explain.

Checklist for Village Level PRA

1. District : 2. VDC :

3. Population of the VDC : Male Female

4. No. of HHs in the VDC :

5. Total cultivated area of the VDC :

6. Percentage of area irrigated :

7. Migration pattern of the VDC

S.No.	Type of migration	Persons migrated		Change in the pattern during last 5 years
		Male	Female	
1.	Seasonal migration to India	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2.	Seasonal migration to other parts of Nepal	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3.	Migration for employment	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4.	Permanent migration	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5.		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

8. Land holding pattern in the VDC

S.No.	Land holding pattern	% distribution
1.	Landless households	<input type="text"/>
2.	Less than 10 ropani (< 15 katha)	<input type="text"/>
3.	10-20 ropani (0.75-3.5 bigaha)	<input type="text"/>
4.	More than 20 ropani (> 3.5 bigaha)	<input type="text"/>

9. Food security situation

S.No.	Food availability	% of family	
		Before 5 years	Now
1.	Enough for whole year		
2.	Enough for six months only		
3.	Enough for 3 months only		
4.	Not even for 3 months		

10. Recovery of food deficit

S.No.	Description	% of HHs
1.	Buy from local market	
2.	Buy from NFC	
3.	Borrow from landlord	
4.	Buy in Terai market	
5.	Use food from food for work programme	
6.	Others (specify)	

11. How do people manage cash to buy food ?

S.No.	Description	% of HHs
1.	Labour sales	
2.	Loan from money lenders	
3.	Animal sale	
4.	Land sale	
5.	Productive asset sale	
6.	Migration	

12. Development programmes going on in the VDC

S.No.	Description	Donor	Type of work	Evaluation of the work
1.	Food for work			
2.	Food for education			
3.	Mother and child health care			

13. Have any development work been withdrawn during last 5 years ?

Yes ☐ No ☐

14. If yes,

S.No.	Development work withdrawn	Reasons of withdrawal
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		

15. Distance to nearest marketkm

16. Do you get your daily needs in the market easily ?

17. Do you feel any change in the availability of food items in the market ? Comparing it with 5 years ago ?
Discuss with reasons.

Checklist for NGO/INGO

1. Name of the NGO/INGO :
2. Name of the district :
3. Programme description

S.No.	Type of the programmes implemented	VDC covered	No. of beneficiary HHs	Starting date	Programme duration	Donor agency
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						

4. How do you evaluate the work done by NGO/INGO ?

Highly successful/medium/not successful.

Give reason in each case.

5. Have you been threatened by any person or group regarding the implementation of the programme ? Why ? What kind of threatening ?
6. Have this NGO/INGO has withdrawn any programme in the district ? why ?
7. What do you think about the food security problem of the district ?
 - a. Problem is severe.
 - b. Some problem.
 - c. No problem at all.
8. Has food security problem in the district in last 5 years improved or worsened? Why ?
9. If worsened, how can be this problem solved ?

World Food Programme and National Labour Academy-Nepal 2002

District:

VDC Classification by Food Security Situation

Name of VDC	*Food availability situation:	Causes of problems in food availability:				Causes of decreasing agri. Production:				Causes of decrease in food imports:				**Food access situation:	Problems in food accessibility:					Food utilization:	Impact of food utilization:	
		a.	b.	c.	d.	a.	b.	c.	d.	a.	b.	c.	d.		a.	b.	c.	d.	e.		a.	b.
1.																						
2.																						
3.																						
4.																						
5.																						
6.																						
7.																						
8.																						
9.																						
10.																						
11.																						

Code:

*Food availability situation	**Food access situation	a, b, c, d, & e
1. No change	1. No change	1. No change
2. General problem	2. General problem	2. General problem
3. Heavy problem	3. Heavy problem	3. Heavy problem
4. Don't know	4. Don't know	4. Don't know

